reilay

This is a collection of simulink blocks implementing simple nonlinear dynamical systems that generate attractors. Two types of general 3D simulink scopes (coded in the s-functions sfunxyz.m and sfunxyzd.m) are used to display in 3D, the evolution of the system during the simulation. Currently (March 2007), the featured systems are Lorenz, Van Der Pol, simple Lotka-Volterra, competitive N-D Lotka Volterra and Henon.

Andrew NG的deep learning教程的练习补全(the completion of exercise or Andrew NG s deep learning tuturials)

this file contain the matlab code and source code file .it is used for separation of lung sound from heart sound

函数用于图象质量评价， 计算梯度均值，标准差，峰值(Function for image quality evaluation, and to calculate the gradient of the mean, standard deviation, peak)

generation of different kinds of random variables

RT9S12 target document

用于截取较长的语音文件，生成新的文件，方便使用，(For the interception of a long sound files, generates a new file, easy to use,)

用matlab做的车牌识别的完整源代码,包括车牌定位,二值化,滤波去噪,字符分割,识别,不过识别部分用的BP网络,(License plate recognition using matlab to do the complete source code, including the license plate location, binarization, filtering denoising, character segmentation, recognition, but identify with some of the BP network,)

带交叉算子的量子粒子群优化算法和粒子群算法的matlab源程序.m(QPSO and PSO with crossover operator. MATLAB CODE)

认知无线电中频谱共享的方法。是基于动态频谱租用的，运用了博弈论的原理。(Hierarchical dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has received the most attention in recent years as the solution for better spectrum utilization. In this paper, on the other hand, we develop a framework for dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL). Power control in hierarchical DSA networks only involves that of controlling secondary user transmissions. Thus, in game theoretic formulations of power control in cognitive DSA networks only secondary users are considered as players of the game. In proposed dynamic spectrum leasing, on the other hand, the primary users are rewarded for allowing secondary users to operate in their licensed spectrum. Thus, in the proposed DSL networks the primary users have an incentive to allow secondary users to access the spectrum whenever possible to the maximum extent. We develop a game theoretic framework for such dynamic spectrum leasing in which primary users actively participate in a non-cooperative game with secondary users by selecting an interfere)